# CP

#### As a Chinese female, I recognize my privilege and the opportunities my social location has given me. However, I also recognize how the state and the institution has oppressed minorities.

#### Mathematics – Mos Def

Yo, it's one universal law but two sides to every story

Three strikes and you be in for life, manditory

Four MC's murdered in the last four years

I ain't tryin to be the fifth one, the millenium is here

Yo it's 6 Million Ways to Die, from the seven deadly thrills

Eight-year olds gettin found with 9 mill's

It's 10 P.M., where your seeds at? What's the deal

He on the hill puffin krill to keep they belly filled

Light in the ass with heavy steel, sights on the pretty shit in life

Young soldiers tryin to earn they next stripe

When the average minimum wage is $5.15

You best believe you gotta find a new ground to get cream

The white unemployment rate, is nearly more than triple for black

so frontliners got they gun in your back

Bubblin crack, jewel theft and robbery to combat poverty

and end up in the global jail economy

Stiffer stipulations attached to each sentence

Budget cutbacks but increased police presence

And even if you get out of prison still livin

join the other five million under state supervision

This is business, no faces just lines and statistics

from your phone, your zip code, to S-S-I digits

#### Being ignorant of your privilege and success in relation to whiteness re-inscribes an unspoken and supplemental antiblackness.

Sullivan, 8

(Professor Philosophy, Women’s Studies, and African and African American Studies @ Pennsylvania State University (Shannon Sullivan, Spring 2008, “Whiteness as Wise Provincialism: Royce and the Rehabilitation of a Racial Category,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, Vol. 44, No. 2, Project Muse)

Like critical conservationists regarding whiteness, Royce knows that he faces an uphill battle in convincing many of his interlocutors of the value of provincialism. Put positively, provincialism tends to connote a healthy fondness for and pride in local traditions, interests, and customs. More negatively, it means being restricted and limited, sticking to the narrow ideas of a given region or group and being indifferent, perhaps even violently hostile to the ways of outsiders. What connects these different meanings is their sense of being rooted in a particular cultural-geographical place. In Royce’s definition, which emphasizes conscious awareness of this rootedness (an important point to which I will return), a province is a domain that is “sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of its distinction from other(s).” And correspondingly, provincialism is, first, the tendency for a group “to possess its own customs and ideals; secondly, the totality of these customs and ideals themselves; and thirdly the love and pride which leads the inhabitants of a province to cherish as their own these traditions, beliefs and aspirations” (61). (End Page 238) Emphasizing unity, love, and pride, Royce’s definitions steer away from the negative connotations of provincialism. But in Royce’s day—and not much has changed in this regard—it was the negative, or “false,” form of provincialism that most often came to people’s minds when they thought about the value and effects of the concept. As Royce was writing in 1902, the false provincialism, or “sectionalism,” of the United States’ Civil War was a recent memory for many of his readers. In the Civil War, stubborn commitment to one portion of the nation violently opposed it to another portion and threatened to tear the nation apart. Provincialism, which appealed to regional values to disunite, had to be condemned in the name of patriotism, which united in the name of a higher good. Royce’s rhetorical strategy is to take the challenge of defending provincialism head-on: “My main intention is to define the right form and the true office of provincialism—to portray what, if you please, we may call the Higher Provincialism, —to portray it, and then to defend it, to extol it, and to counsel you to further just such provincialism” (65). Royce readily acknowledges that “against the evil forms of sectionalism we shall always have to contend” (64). But he denies that provincialism must always be evil. Going against the grain of most post-Civil War thinking about provincialism, Royce urges that the present state of civilization, both in the world at large, and with us, in America, is such as to define a new social mission which the province alone, but not the nation, is able to fulfil (sic) . . . .(T)he modern world has reached a point where it needs, more than ever before, the vigorous development of a highly organized provincial life. Such a life, if wisely guided, will not mean disloyalty to the nation. (64) Wisely developed, provincialism need not conflict with national loyalty. The two commitments can—and must, Royce insists—flourish together. Likewise, whiteness need not conflict with membership in humanity as a whole. The two identities can—and must—flourish together. The relationship between provincialism and nationalism, as discussed by Royce, serves as a fruitful model for the relationship of whiteness and humanity, and critical conservationists of whiteness should follow Royce’s lead by taking head-on the challenge of critically defending whiteness. Like embracing provincialism, embracing whiteness might seem to be a step backward for the modern world—toward limitation and insularity that breed ignorance, prejudice, and hostility toward others who are different from oneself. Like having a national rather than provincial worldview, seeing oneself as a member of humanity rather than of the white race seems to embody an expansive, outward (End Page 239) orientation that is open to others. But there is a “new social mission” with respect to racial justice that whiteness, and not humanity as a whole, can fulfill. Race relations, especially in the United States, have reached a point where humanity needs a “highly organized” anti-racist whiteness, that is, an anti-racist whiteness that is consciously developed and embraced. How then can we (white people, in particular) wisely guide the development of such whiteness so that it does not result in disloyalty to other races and humanity as a whole? Before addressing this question, let me point out two important differences between whiteness and provincialism as described by Royce. First, while Royce calls for the development of a wise form of provincialism, he is able to appeal to existing “wholesome” forms of provincialism in his defense of the concept. He addresses himself “in the most explicit terms, to men and women who, as I hope and presuppose, are and wish to be, in the wholesome sense, provincial,” and his demand that “the man of the future . . . love his province more than he does to-day” recognizes a nugget of wise provincialism on which to build (65, 67). The development of wise provincialism does not have to be from scratch. In contrast, it is more difficult to pinpoint a nugget of “wholesome” whiteness to use as a starting point for its transformation. Instances of white people who helped slaves and resisted slavery in the United States, for example, certainly can be found—the infamous John Brown is only one such example—but such people often are seen as white race traitors who represent the abolition, not the transformation of whiteness.9 The task of critically conserving whiteness probably will be more difficult than that of critically conserving provincialism since there is not a straightforward or obvious “right form and true office” of whiteness to extol. Second, true to his idealism, Royce describes both provincialism and its development as explicitly conscious phenomena. Royce notes the elasticity of the term “province”—it can designate a small geographical area in contrast with the nation, or it can designate a large geographical, rural area in contrast with a city (57–58)—but it always includes consciousness of the province’s unity and particular identity as this place and not another. Put another way, probably every space, regardless of its size, is distinctive in some way or another. What gives members of a space a provincial attitude is their conscious awareness of, and resulting pride in, that space as the distinctive place that it is. On Royce’s model, someone who is provincial knows that she is, at least in some loose way. The task of developing her provincialism, then, is to develop her rudimentary conscious awareness of her province, to become “more and not less self-conscious, well-established, and earnest” in her provincial outlook (67). In contrast—and here lies the largest difference between provincialism and whiteness—many white people today do not consciously think of themselves as members of this (white) race and not another, not even loosely. Excepting members of white militant groups such as the Ku (End Page 240) Klux Klan or the Creativity Movement, contemporary white people do not tend to have a conscious sense of unity as fellow white people, nor do they consciously invoke or share special ideals, customs, or common memories as white people. They often are perceived and perceive themselves as raceless, as members of the human species at large rather than members of a particular racial group. This does not eliminate their whiteness or their membership in a fairly unified group. Just the opposite: such “racelessness” is one of the marks and privileges of membership in whiteness, especially middle and upper class forms of whiteness. White people can feel a pride in the ideals and customs of whiteness and possess a sense of distinction from people of other races without much, if any conscious awareness of their whiteness and without consciously identifying those ideals and customs as white. To take one brief example, styles and customs of communication in classrooms tend to be raced (as well as classed and gendered), and white styles of discussion, hand-raising, and turn-taking tend to be treated as appropriate while black styles are seen as inappropriate.10 White students often learn to feel proud and validated by their teachers as good students when they participate in these styles, and this almost always happens without either students or teachers consciously identifying their style (or themselves) as white. Such students appear to belong and experience themselves as belonging merely to a group of smart, orderly, responsible students, not to a racialized group. In the United States and Western world more broadly, unconscious habits of whiteness and white privilege have tended to increase after the end of de jure racism.11 Unlike provincialism as described by Royce, whiteness tends to operate more sub- and unconsciously than consciously. But I do not think that this fact spoils wise provincialism as a fruitful model for wise whiteness. First, and reflecting a basic philosophical disagreement that I have with Royce’s idealism, I doubt that provincialism always functions as consciously as Royce suggests it does. The unity, pride, and love that are the hallmarks of provincialism could easily function in the form of unreflective beliefs, habits, preferences, and even bodily comportment. In fact I would argue that many aspects of our provincial loyalties—whatever type of province is at issue—operate on sub- or unconscious levels. In that case, provincialism and whiteness would not be as dissimilar in their operation as Royce’s description implies. Second, even if provincialism tends to consciously unify people while whiteness does not, Royce’s advice that people should attempt to become more, rather than less self-conscious in their provincialism still applies to white people with respect to their whiteness. Given whiteness’s history as a racial category of violent exclusion and oppression, one might think that white people need to focus less on their whiteness, to distance themselves from it. But just the opposite is the case. Given (End Page 241) that distance from racial identification tends to be the covert modus operandi for contemporary forms of white privilege, white people who wish to fight racism need to become more intimately acquainted with their whiteness. Rather than ignore their whiteness, which allows unconscious habits of white privilege to proliferate unchecked, white people need to bring their whiteness to as much conscious awareness as possible (while also realizing that complete self-transparency is never achievable) so that they can try to change what it means.

#### Whiteness is performed. Within debate space it is not simply enough to be ‘antiracist,’ but rather changing the way we perform ourselves in the debate space is the only way to combat whiteness.

Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley et al, 13

(Dr. Shanara R. Reid-Brinkley, PhD, Assistant Professor of Public Address and Advocacy, Director of Debate, William Pitt Debating Union, Amber Kelsie, M.A., Nicholas Brady, 2013, http://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/, Accessed 1/25/14, NC)

There is no racism without bodies coded and trained through practice. There are subjectivities that are raced which means that there are bodies that “look white” that are implicated in whiteness. White privilege in this frame can be recognized as an unearned benefit while offering a position of redemption when privilege is used toward anti-racist efforts. Yet, one can simultaneously be engaged in good anti-racist work as a white person, while engaging in political and social actions that reproduce privilege. And yet, we already recognize that whiteness is not just about skin color, though we cannot deny the existence of white-skin privilege. Whiteness is normative—it produces behavioral and performative patterns that sustain the significance of whiteness as a signifier. Bankey critiques what he calls “Reid-Brinkley’s model for resistance in the flesh” as a failed political project with dangerous implications for contemporary debate practice.

#### Traditional knowledge production in debate leads to epistemological myopia, The Alt offers an alternative method of the three-tier process, which does not exclude, but augments traditional knowledge production.

Dr. Reid-Brinkley, University of Pittsburgh Department Of Communications, 8

("THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE" pages 81-83) (\*\*\*Edited for ablist language)

The process of **signifyin**’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters **is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence; their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.”** In other words, **those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These** legitimating **practices** usually **function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledge-making practices,** while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making practices**.** The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.” Jones and Green offer **an alternative framework for drawing claims**in debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. Andwe talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three ~~blind folded~~ [masked] people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then **you can achieve a greater truth.”** Jones argues that without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the double-octo-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets**,** **through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.**” The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices. With the Louisville method, **personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence.** While the Louisville debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions because of their lack of training and expertise. Such exclusions prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how **when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless.** That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. **That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop.** That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you **don’t get just one perspective** **claiming to be the right way.** **Because it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education.**The use of **hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse.** Note the reference to bell hooks, Green argues that without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term **rootless** seems to **refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances** that academics or experts study. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that **which they study.** For the Louisville debaters, **this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression.**¶

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the team that best performatively and methodologically challenges the dominant normative structures of debate.

#### This Alternative form of knowledge production leads to a double conscious. The inclusion of personal narratives allows us to reflect on out own social location, while alternate forms of knowledge allow us to understand the oppression of others. By teaching code switching we allow intra-communal discussion.

Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley et al, 13

(Dr. Shanara R. Reid-Brinkley, PhD, Assistant Professor of Public Address and Advocacy, Director of Debate, William Pitt Debating Union, Amber Kelsie, M.A., Nicholas Brady, 2013, http://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/, Accessed 1/25/14, NC)

Bankey’s positioning of himself at the borderland while excluding (multiply situated) black people in debate from that same space makes little sense to those familiar with the history of race in America. Black people have never not had to be in close relation to whiteness. This is Dubois’ theory of double consciousness (which, though especially emblematic of black experience, is a way of understanding the world that can be learned by non-blacks). Black people have always existed in an in-between space of blackness and whiteness with anti-blackness serving as the context for this relationship. Black folks in America are always already in an interracial relationship with whiteness; this is especially true in the context of debate. The tone of Bankey’s criticism assumes black people exclude white people from their space, but MPJ and other debate practices demonstrate the direct manner in which white people exclude black people from interracial dialogue in the debate space. An even more recent example of how structural racism functions is the exclusion of Elijah Smith, the reigning NDT champ, from the Kentucky Round Robin, and the attempt to change the rules pertaining to transfer students. We are disappointed by this addition to the consistent complaint made by whites that black people must be constantly accessible to whites even while white people disavow the structure of policed segregation in supposedly common spaces. In fact, it seems quite likely that this thesis will inspire debate arguments that produce exclusions of black students rather than an inclusive space of participation. We find it highly unlikely that it will produce an authentic communication or disalienation. There are countless examples of the manner in which black people attempt to meet the communicative and bodily expectations of dominant culture and dominant debate. Code-switching is part and parcel of our interracial romance with debate, an example of our commitment to compromise. Black people often code-switch into “white-people speak” when dealing with white people while using black language and tonal intonations (regionally specific) when in majority black spaces (in fact, it seems that it is when we “speak authentically” in the presence of whites—share ourselves with whites—that we are charged with the crime of being “intentionally” unintelligible). Within debates, (vis-à-vis framework for example) there is a denial or a disavowal of even the possibility of an engagement across rhetorical difference, which is the move Bankey makes. He refuses to code switch in the thesis by not attempting to understand the kinship networks in debate for black people or to engage in rhetorical practices to demonstrate a commitment to engaging difference at the level of method and performance.[9] How often do we encounter white people who can code-switch (and no we don’t mean the latest hip hop slang) into the communicative and socio-political practices of black culture? The black is always already at the borderland. But double consciousness is something that for most people—especially non-blacks—must be learned and practiced. We believe that these kinds of practices and attempts on the part of black people to meet whites more than half-way are evident for those who choose to see. But also we must point out that in communication studies code-switching, the vernacular, counter-publics, and many other concepts evoke the double-sidedness of rhetorical practice in ways that complicate the very notion that there could ever be a pure communication. We therefore invite Bankey to read the Communication Studies section of the library as well as the Black Studies section.

# Case

### biotech

#### There is no internal link and reason why lifting the scientific part of the embargo will be able to solve the soil erosion. There’s also alt cause like the weather, wind, rain, etc. these things lead to the soil eroding. There’s no impact, soil erosion has been happening forever and we’re all still alive.

#### Indigenous knowledge is key to achieving an understanding of how to properly manage the environment

Rajeskaran, 93

B. Rajasekaran, Center for Indigenous Knowledge for Agriculture and Rural Development, Iowa State, 1993 (“A framework for incorporating indigenous knowledge systems into agricultural research, extension, and NGOs for sustainable agricultural development.” Studies in Technology and Social Change No. 21. Technology and Social Change Program, Iowa State University, 1993, http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/docs/004-201/004-201.html)

**Indigenous knowledge is local knowledge that is unique to a given culture or society** (Warren, 1987). Indigenous knowledge is the systematic body of knowledge acquired by local people through the accumulation of experiences, informal experiments, and intimate understanding of the environment in a given culture (Rajasekaran, 1993). According to Haverkort (1991), indigenous knowledge is the actual knowledge of a given population that reflects the experiences based on traditions and includes more recent experiences with modern technologies. Local people, including farmers, landless laborers, women, rural artisans, and cattle rearers, are the custodians of indigenous knowledge systems. Moreover, **these people are well informed about their own situations, their resources, what works and doesn't work, and how one change impacts other parts of their system** (Butler and Waud, 1990). 1.2 Value of indigenous knowledge Indigenous knowledge is dynamic, changing through indigenous mechanisms of creativity and innovativeness as well as through contact with other local and international knowledge systems (Warren, 1991). These knowledge systems may appear simple to outsiders but they represent mechanisms to ensure minimal livelihoods for local people. **Indigenous knowledge systems often are elaborate, and they are adapted to local cultural and environmental conditions** (Warren, 1987). **Indigenous knowledge systems are tuned to the needs of local people and the quality and quantity of available resources** (Pretty and Sandbrook, 1991). They pertain to various cultural norms, social roles, or physical conditions. Their efficiency lies in the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. According to Norgaard (1984, p. 7): Traditional knowledge has been viewed as part of a romantic past, as the major obstacle to development, as a necessary starting point, and as a critical component of a cultural alternative to modernization. Only very rarely, however, is **traditional knowledge** treated as knowledge per se in the mainstream of the agricultural and development and environmental management literature, as knowledge that **contributes to our understanding of agricultural production and the maintenance and use of environmental systems**. 1.3 Diversity of indigenous knowledge **Indigenous knowledge systems are**: adaptive skills of local people usually derived from many years of experience, that have often been communicated through "oral traditions" and learned through family members over generations (Thrupp, 1989), **time-tested agricultural and natural resource management practices, which pave the way for sustainable agriculture**.

#### Biotech inevitable

D'Haeze, ‘7   
(Wim, Bio-Engineer in Chemistry and received his Ph.D. in Biotechnology at Ghent University, Senior Technical Writer in the pharmaceutical, "Blooming Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industries," 10-15, The Science Advisory Board, http://www.scienceboard.net/community/perspectives.193.html)

Whoever regularly follows the news will recognize that **the Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industry is** still expanding – **booming** – **in** the United States and **Europe**, but also in major Asian countries such as **India, China, and Japan**. **A pattern that is often observed for pharmaceutical companies is headquartering in a major location** in the United States or Europe **while branching elsewhere in** the United States, **Europe, and/or Asia**. Those processes are highly dependent on how successfully drug candidates move through the drug development pipelines and on how the drug development process is organized, planned, and executed. Research and Development hubs are located at the East coast (e.g., New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Northern and Central New Jersey) and West coast (e.g., San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle) of the United States and throughout major cities in Europe, but **multinational companies have been or are stepping on land in countries throughout Asia** as well. **Reasons** for the latter development **may include substantial cheaper labor as compared to that in developed countries and the ability to produce medicines close to the market place**. During recent years, **India**, for example, **has become the home of a few hundred registered biotech and pharmaceutical companies and is now positioned within the top-5 producers of pharmaceuticals**. Interestingly, the majority of its export (e.g., production of diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (DTP) vaccine) goes to developing countries. Companies such as Biocon, Novo Nordisk, Aventis Pharma, Chiron Behring Vaccines, GlaxoSmithKline, Novozymes, Eli Lilly & Company, and Advanced Biochemicals are all represented in major Indian cities, including Bangalore, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Pune, and New Delhi. In 2005, Indian biotech and pharmaceutical companies represented a revenue of more than US$1 billion and the governmental goal articulated by the Indian Department of Biotechnology is to create a biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry generating US$5 billion in revenues annually and representing one million jobs by roughly three years from now. **The government tries to achieve this goal in part by facilitating foreign-owned companies to establish in India, making it easier for investors by centralizing the process, creating at least ten new science parks by 2010, financially supporting new drug discovery proposals and research, and by supporting small biotech and pharmaceutical businesses and start-up companies.**

#### Disease rhetoric is not immune to the clutches of the colonial mindset. Diseases are constructed as problems of developing countries that only Western Medicine can fix.

UFS, 2k

(Unite For Sight's Global Health University is designed to develop and nurture the next generation of global health leaders. Global Health University helps to effect widespread innovative change in global health through comprehensive training workshops and idea incubators, 2000, http://www.uniteforsight.org/global-health-history/module2, Accessed 12/17/13, NC)

Furthermore, the legacy of colonialism left its mark on the western world, as public health conceived of and practiced in the United States and Western Europe during the past century has primarily been a state activity and has been closely connected to the protection of the state’s interests. With concerns of an increasingly globalized world, many of the health issues that policy-makers face today remain “international” health issues. One of the key principles of this international conception of global health has been to protect citizens against threats perceived as having an external origin, particularly infectious diseases carried across national borders. “During the 1990s, American scientists, public health officials and defense experts argued that ‘emerging diseases’ presented a threat to American national security, international development and global health. In doing so, they recapitulated the previous century’s dominant logics of international health policy”.(11) Public health has thus been ‘international’, and closely allied with ideologies of national security and commerce.

Furthermore, Western medical research has addressed the needs of the developing world in beneficial ways—by developing quinine as a malarial prophylactic, prevention for yellow fever, etc.—but it has done so with a “West first” attitude consistent with the ethos of colonialism. The advances made in vaccinations, preventions, and treatments were researched almost exclusively because Western nations had military or commercial interest in areas where tropical diseases were prevalent. Through prevention and treatment, the international spread of disease was curbed and the extraction of wealth was preserved.

### solvency

#### The dichotomy perpetuated in Western society between culture and nature portrays the environment as a machine to be controlled

Zent 13 (Eglee L Zent, Laboratory of Human Ecology, Venezuelan Institute for Scientiﬁc Research. "Jot¨ı ecogony, Venezuelan Amazon" January 31, 2013. iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/8/1/015008/pdf/1748-9326\_8\_1\_015008.pdf)

Diversity sustains life. Heterogeneity of notions, ethics and¶ logics offers potential alternatives to alleviate the world’s¶ environmental crisis. Historical records worldwide register¶ the conscious attempts of hegemonic societies to homogenize¶ the ethos of their colonized subjects. Notions of nature in¶ Western1¶ thought provide a good illustration of such disregard¶ for diversity. The amount of written and graphic material¶ produced to describe the multiple conceptions of deﬁning¶ and acting on nature is overwhelming. A diachronic view¶ of Western concepts of nature reveals this notion as an¶ episteme2¶ , a logical construct built up through centuries¶ (Zent 2012). Nature, a word deriving from Latin natura ˜¶ (after the verb nasci ˜ , born) which in turn comes from¶ the Greek phusis (' & K , physis), has been seen from¶ many perspectives: teleological (the immanent presence of¶ ultimate purpose), ethical (intrinsic versus extrinsic values¶ as receptacles of inﬁnite or ﬁnite resources), theological¶ (sacred and secular) and ontological (the condition of the¶ object or subject). In ancient Greece and Rome, a diverse¶ assortment of philosophers and schools of thought (Torrance¶ 1992, p v, Lloyd 1992, p 2, Bargatzky and Kuschel¶ 1994, p 6) endeavored to delineate nature. Physis was a¶ Greek protogenic goddess who embodied life, an immanent¶ hypostatic entity with breath, animus, spirit, volition and¶ morality comprising the mind structure and meanings that¶ generate diverse life-forms. The translation of physis to natura¶ in Latin emphasized the inherent movement, emergence and¶ rise of physis (Heidegger 2000, pp 13–15). The culture–nature¶ dichotomy made explicit by Descartes many centuries later¶ started to build from this period. Physis was simultaneously¶ divine-apprehensible and material-apprehensible through the¶ senses, including the mind and soul (Heidegger 2000, p 13)¶ until the Presocratics initiated the reduction of nature to¶ organic processes. Previous to Plato and Aristotle, physis¶ had at least four connotations: primordial matter, origin,¶ process and result (Naddaf 2005, p 3, 163; Lloyd 1992,¶ p 12). Physis was not completely separated from ontological¶ and mythological views, nor from discussions about the¶ natural etiology of diseases and illnesses (Lloyd 1992, p 8).¶ The shift from myth to logo is attributed to philosophers¶ after Socrates, when physis was opposed to nomo (oKo&,¶ socially built norm, experience and order) and to techne¶ ("­ K , art, craft, practical method for creating an object or¶ reaching an objective). These partitions are the foundation¶ of oppositions between nature and culture, art or artifact¶ (Lloyd 1992, p 13; Inwood 1999, p 137). Once the myth¶ was exscinded by logical thought, a more secular view of¶ nature was fabricated linked to Plato’s pre-eminence of logic¶ as offering phenomenological and causal explanations to all¶ inquiries. Christian medieval tradition found continuity in the¶ notion of nature, the world of sensual phenomena associated¶ with the perfect world of ideals (cf Inwood 1999, p 14)¶ inasmuch as all forms of sensible assemblages were attributed¶ to Godly orderliness (Zent 2012). The Renaissance added¶ to this mixture an anthropocentric environmental ethics that¶ was consolidated during the Enlightenment (mid-15th to early¶ 19th centuries) with the search for rational causal explanations¶ to worldly phenomena: ‘the 17th-century conception of nature¶ has remained the basis of the Western view of reality¶ ever since, so that it is impossible to imagine the whole¶ enterprise of modern science, the central and determining¶ feature of contemporary Western Civilization, apart from this¶ background (Westfall 1992, pp 64–65)’.¶ It is naive to assume homogeneous processes or absolute¶ concepts in the broad and incomplete temporal and spatial¶ spectrum mentioned above. A hegemonic new vision emerged¶ however, during the 17th century: natural (object) and social¶ (subject) spheres were axiomatically separated. From this¶ period forward, the new (scientiﬁc?) construction of nature¶ as object has been inherently secular. The ofﬁcial view,¶ consolidated with the formulation of French philosopher¶ Rene Descartes (1596–1650), established nature as a machine, ´¶ quantiﬁed and explained with accuracy (Westfall 1992,¶ pp 70–1) in terms of isolated compartments without¶ understanding its integral design (cf Bargatzky 1994, p 18,¶ Berner 1994, p 29). This conception, however, did not¶ eradicate the persistent subjectiﬁcation or animation of nature¶ in other social contexts.¶ The current environmental crisis (brought on by the¶ massive extinction of species, populations, communities,¶ ecosystems, landscapes at local, regional and national levels,¶ as well as languages, religions and culture traits, and¶ irrespective of any national or political border) necessarily¶ demanded a profound rethinking of the nature concept.¶ Such re-conceptualization had an initial drive during the¶ mid-1960s with the ecosystem theory (Odum 1993). A¶ second vigorous moment, persistent until now, is given¶ by the explicit call for action in the ﬁeld of biological¶ and cultural conservation which has pervaded science, mass¶ media and global politics. A crucial aspect demands change¶ in people’s environmental ethics involving attention to¶ human positioning toward non-humans and their surroundings¶ commonly synthesized as intrinsic versus instrumental values¶ (Lewis 1970, Rolson 1975, Regan 1981). The proliferation¶ of conservationist creeds and action plans, as expressed in¶ multiple declarations, treaties, conventions, laws, movements,¶ international campaigns (e.g. Convention on International¶ Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora¶ 1973, United Nations 1987, UNCED 1992b, UNCED¶ 1992a, Kyoto Treaty 1997, World Wildlife Foundation¶ 1986, 1999, 2002, UNCED 2002, etc) and so forth, has¶ legitimated these categories to the extent of institutionalizing¶ a global conservation agenda halfway between praxis and¶ discourse. Eclectic ethics informed by a variety of worldwide¶ philosophies and beliefs have taken particular active roles¶ in the implementation and adherence of global behavioral¶ changes toward nature. Some successful movements such as¶ Deep Ecology (Næss 1973), Autopoiesis (Varela et al 1974),¶ Gaia (Lovelock 1979) and Biophilia (Wilson 1984) have¶ gained many supporters in academic, religious and lay circles¶ (Zent 2012). These movements and others with the same¶ proﬁle and aim are linked by a main goal: the preservation¶ of life on Earth. These views, as we shall see below, are not¶ that different from ancestral ones in the Americas.

**The veneration of positivist thought is a key process in rendering colonized, raced, and gendered bodies as objects.**

Reiner **Schurman. 1990.** Heidegger on Being and Acting: from principles to anarchy. pg 266 -kpcb

Originarily, busy-ness is that modern scheme of transformation through which 'things' lose their 'world' by becoming 'objects'. This scheme is imposing itself today on all entities as such, without exception. The logic of technology consists in building object-being in to them. The logic of *mathesis* and the (transcendantal subjectivist) logic of object constitution have prevailed beyond Descartes' and Kant's fondest dreams, as the way of being 'objectively present' or 'given for handling' (*vorhanden)* gets built into everything, including the subject. This is a logic of implacable violence. "In busy-ness the project of the object-region gets primordially built into entities." 'Region' does not refer to regional ontology, which is an a-historical phenomenology. If the object-region arises from the modern subject asserting itself, 'region' is a term of a historical ontology, of the history of being. What is primordial for modernity is that only the empirically verifiable is present. Furthermore, if modernity originates with (although not from) experimental science, then the endless *et cetera*  of hypotheses, is the original busy-ness. Under this concept, then, Heidegger exhibits one of the basic traits of science, namely, that the results of previous research prescribe the ways and means to be adhered to in new research. "This need to adapt itself to its own results as the ways and means of advancing its procedure is the essence of busy-ness as a feature of research." Busy-ness designates the process through which experimental sciences perpetuate themselves by feeding on their own products. But from the start the experimental sciences have been in the service of practical mastery over nature, not vice versa. Technology, the contemporary figure of that mastery, a figure "whose essence is identical with the essence of modern metaphysics," equally progresses and even maintains itself only on the condition of eating its own children, like Kronos. The "priority of procedure over entities (Nature and History)" means "science as research has, in itself, the character of busy-ness." In the bustle of scientific research the omnivorous essence of technology shows forth, which in turn finally reveals the violence inherent in the fundamental position of metaphysics boundary epoch.